MILLER (DO NOT DELETE)

4/1/2020 10:53 PM

A COMPARISON OF THE HOUSE AND SENATE JUDICIARY
COMMITTEES AND
THEIR RELATIONSHIPS TO THE FEDERAL COURTS
Mark C. Miller*
I. INTRODUCTION .............................................................................. 207
II. THE JUDICIARY COMMITTEES AS REFLECTING THE CULTURES OF
THEIR RESPECTIVE CHAMBERS ............................................. 210
III. JUDICIAL NOMINATIONS AND CONFIRMATIONS ......................... 218
IV. ROUTINE AND NON-ROUTINE INTERACTIONS BETWEEN CONGRESS
AND THE COURTS ................................................................... 226
V. THE COMMITTEES OF LAWYERS .................................................. 239
VI. THE ROLE OF THE COMMITTEE CHAIR ....................................... 244
VII. CONCLUSIONS............................................................................ 249
I. INTRODUCTION
One key element of the interactions between the U.S. Congress and the
federal courts is the relationship between the federal judiciary and the
primary committees in Congress. Both the House Judiciary Committee and
the Senate Judiciary Committee have jurisdiction over most issues affecting
the judicial branch. There is very little academic literature that directly
compares the U.S. House and Senate Judiciary Committees. It can be even
harder to find literature that compares the committees’ respective
relationships and their interactions with the federal courts. This article will
attempt to fill this void. This article will bring a new institutionalist approach
to the analysis of the interactions between Congress and the federal courts,1
* Miller is a professor of political science, former chair of the Department of Political
Science, and the director of the university’s Law & Society program at Clark University in
Worcester, Massachusetts. B.A. Ohio Northern University, J.D. George Washington
University, Ph.D. The Ohio State University. He served as the Judicial Fellow at the Supreme
Court of the United States from 1999-2000, and he was a Congressional Fellow in 1995.
During 2006-07, he was a Visiting Scholar at the Centennial Center for Public Policy of the
American Political Science Association. During the spring of 2008, he was the Thomas
Jefferson Distinguished Chair, a Fulbright scholar to the American Studies Program and the
History Department at Leiden University in the Netherlands. For the academic year 2014-15,
he held the Distinguished Fulbright Bicentennial Chair in North American Studies at the
University of Helsinki in Finland. Financial assistance for this project came in part from the
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focusing on the respective relationships between the federal courts and each
of the two Judiciary Committees in Congress. This research is supplemented
by personal interviews that I have conducted over the years with Members
of Congress, congressional staff, federal judges, lobbyists, and those
working in think tanks and other organizations that focus on the work of the
judiciary and its relationship to Congress.2
Many judicial and congressional scholars conclude that Congress and
the federal courts are two political institutions that should not be studied in
isolation.3 As Kevin den Dulk and Mitchell Pickerill have argued, “treating
the Court or Congress in isolation misconstrues the nature of interinstitutional lawmaking in the United States. The actions of each institution
have important reciprocal effects; both contribute to the form and substance

Patron-Cohen Endowed Faculty Research Fund at Clark University. Special thanks to
Michael Spanos for his help in preparing this manuscript.1 New institutionalism means that
scholars explore how “institutional cultures, structures, rules, and norms constrain the choices
and action of individuals when they serve in a political institution. New institutionalism thus
combines the interests of traditionalist scholars in studying formal institutional rules and
structures with the focus of behavioralist scholars on examining the action of individual
political actors.” MARK C. MILLER, JUDICIAL POLITICS IN THE UNITED STATES 185 (2015).
[HEREINAFTER MILLER, JUDICIAL POLITICS]. For example, Gibson has summarized the study
of judicial behavior using the new institutionalist model in this way, “In a nutshell, judges’
decisions are a function of what they prefer to do, tempered by what they think they ought to
do, but constrained by what they perceive is feasible to do.” James L. Gibson, From Simplicity
to Complexity: The Development of Theory in the Study of Judicial Behavior, 5 AMER. POL.
BEHAVIOR 7, 9 (1983).
2
For all of my interviews, I promised the participants that I would not reveal their
names nor the identities of their employers. I first interviewed Members of Congress and
staff who served on the House Judiciary Committee (among other committees) in 1989. An
analysis of those interviews including quotations from the interviews can be found in M ARK
C. MILLER, THE HIGH PRIESTS OF AMERICAN POLITICS: THE ROLE OF LAWYERS IN AMERICAN
POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS (1995). [HEREINAFTER MILLER, HIGH PRIESTS]. I conducted other
interviews during the 2006-2007 academic year, and the analysis of those interviews and
quotations can be found in MARK C. MILLER, THE VIEW OF THE COURTS FROM THE HILL (2009).
[HEREINAFTER MILLER, VIEW OF THE COURTS]. For this current project, I conducted additional
interviews during the summers of 2017 and 2018. Financial assistance for conducting these
latest interviews came in part from the Patron-Cohen Endowed Faculty Research Fund at
Clark University.
Over the years, it has become much more difficult to interview current congressional staff,
especially in the House of Representatives. After a request for an interview with a House
staffer, I received the following email in July of 2018, which has become a typical response
for interview requests. “Unfortunately, our office has a blanket policy of not participating in
any types of research or surveys, including ones that aren’t for attribution or where data is not
disaggregated.”
3
See, e.g., ROBERT A. KATZMANN, ED., JUDGES AND LEGISLATORS: TOWARDS
INSTITUTIONAL COMITY (1988); CHARLES GARDNER GEYH, WHEN COURTS AND CONGRESS
COLLIDE: THE STRUGGLE FOR CONTROL OF AMERICA’S JUDICIAL SYSTEM (2006); J. MITCHELL
PICKERILL, CONSTITUTIONAL DELIBERATION IN CONGRESS: THE IMPACT OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
IN A SEPARATED SYSTEM (2004);
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of law.”4 These interactions are a normal part of the American system of
separation of powers. As Thomas Clark reminds us, “[s]eparation of powers
represents perhaps the most important contribution the American experiment
has made to constitutional democracy throughout the world.”5
While there is a great deal of academic literature that analyzes the
workings of the U.S. Congress or the federal judiciary independently, there
is far less literature that examines the interactions between these two federal
governmental institutions.6 Unfortunately, this relationship is not well
understood by scholars, practitioners, or members serving in the two
governmental institutions.7 Our lack of understanding of the interactions
between these two branches can have serious public policy ramifications
because each institution plays a significant role in the legislative and
policymaking process. As Pickerill explains, “Lawmaking in our separated
system is continuous, iterative, speculative, sequential, and declarative . . .
and consequently each institution in our system must necessarily anticipate,
interact with, and react to the actions of the other institutions.”8 Thus, in
general, the relationship between Congress and the federal courts is generally
ill-defined, amorphous, and perhaps situationally dependent.9
Not only do we need a better understanding of the relationship between
Congress and the courts, but also these two branches do not understand each
other very well. As Robert Katzmann has argued, “Th[e] study of judicialcongressional relations is rooted in the premise that the two branches lack
appreciation of each other’s processes and problems, with unfortunate
consequences for both and for policymaking more generally.”10 In 2018, I
interviewed an employee of a think tank who also recognized this problem,
4
Kevin R. den Dulk & J. Mitchell Pickerill, Bridging the Lawmaking Process:
Organized Interests, Court-Congress Interactions, and Church-State Relations, 35 POLITY
419, 420 (2003).
5
TOM S. CLARK, THE LIMITS OF JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE 1 (2011).
6
Some example of works that examine the interactions between Congress and the
federal courts include STEPHEN M. ENGEL, AMERICAN POLITICIANS CONFRONT THE COURT:
OPPOSITION POLITICS AND CHANGING RESPONSES TO JUDICIAL POWER (2011); ROSS K. BAKER,
STRANGERS ON A HILL: CONGRESS AND THE COURT (2007); GEYH, supra note 3; PICKERILL,
supra note 3; JEB BARNES, OVERRULED?: LEGISLATIVE OVERRIDES, PLURALISM, AND
CONTEMPORARY COURT-CONGRESS RELATIONS (2004); GEORGE I. LOVELL, LEGISLATIVE
DEFERRALS: STATUTORY AMBIGUITY, JUDICIAL POWER, AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2003);
COLTON C. CAMPBELL AND JOHN F. STACK, JR., EDS., CONGRESS CONFRONTS THE COURT: THE
STRUGGLE FOR LEGITIMACY AND AUTHORITY IN LAWMAKING (2001); KATZMANN, supra note
3; ROBERT A. KATZMANN, COURTS & CONGRESS (1997).
7
MICHAEL A. BAILEY, FORREST MALTZMAN, & CHARLES R. SHIPAN, THE AMORPHOUS
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CONGRESS AND THE COURTS, THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE
AMERICAN CONGRESS 834 (ERIC SCHICKLER & FRANCES E. LEE, EDS. 2011).
8
Pickerill, supra note 3, at 4.
9
See generally MILLER, VIEW OF THE COURTS, supra note 2.
10
KATZMANN, supra note 3, at 1.
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stating, “There is an inherent institutional distance between judges and
legislators. There is a lack of understanding between the branches. Most
Members of Congress only have a vague idea of what the federal courts
actually do.”11 Given this lack of understanding between the branches, it is
not surprising that our understanding of the relationship between the two
institutions is often fuzzy. The constitutional relationship between the two
branches is equally nebulous. As Michael Bailey, Forrest Maltzman, and
Charles Shipan conclude, “Whereas Congress’s relationship with the
executive is spelled out in detail in the Constitution, the relationship between
Congress and the judiciary was left by the founders to be defined by history.
Since history is rarely tidy or consistent, the relationship that exists between
the courts and Congress is as messy as the Constitution itself.”12 This
messiness is also reflected in the different ways that the two Judiciary
Committees interact with the federal judiciary.
II. THE JUDICIARY COMMITTEES AS REFLECTING THE CULTURES OF THEIR
RESPECTIVE CHAMBERS
In many ways, the House and Senate Judiciary Committees reflect the
institutional cultures of their respective broader chambers. As Woodrow
Wilson in 1885 famously observed, “Congress in session is Congress on
public exhibition, whilst Congress in its committee-rooms is Congress at
work.”13 Generally, the House is designed to meet the needs of the majority
party in the chamber, while the Senate is much more protective of the rights
of individual Senators.14 House members, with their short two-year terms
and generally smaller, often more homogeneous constituencies, are normally
closer to the views of the voters in part because House members are
constantly running for reelection.15 The House is also a highly hierarchical
institution where power alternates over time between party leaders and
committee chairs.16 Ambitious U.S. Representatives must find ways to
position themselves to gain these leadership positions if power in the
chamber is one of their goals.17 Congressmen and Congresswomen serve on
a relatively small number of committees, and House members tend to
specialize through their committee posts in order to be noticed in their very
11

See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
BAILEY, MALTZAN, & SHIPAN, supra note 7, at 835.
13
WOODROW WILSON, CONGRESSIONAL GOVERNMENT (1885).
14
David W Rohde, Committees and Policy Formulation, in THE LEGISLATIVE BRANCH
219 (Paul J. Quick & Sarah A. Binder eds., 2005).
15
Id.
16
See, e.g., John H. Aldrich & David W. Rohde, Lending and Reclaiming Power:
Majority Leadership in the House Since the 1950’s, in CONGRESS RECONSIDERED (Lawrence
C. Dodd & Bruce I. Oppenheimer, eds., 11TH ED. 2017).
17
RICHARD F. FENNO, CONGRESSMEN IN COMMITTEES (1973).
12
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large and crowded chamber.18
Senators, on the other hand, have the luxury of six-year terms and have
larger, usually more heterogeneous, constituencies within their states which
often force them to be generalists who take a broader public policy view on
many issues.19 In addition, the Senate has the same number of committees
as the House with far fewer members to fill those committee slots.20 While
House members concentrate on a small number of committees, Senators are
often spread very thin among a large number of committee and
subcommittee assignments.21 On the other hand, the smaller size of the
chamber also benefits Senators because almost every Senator in the majority
party is a committee or subcommittee chair.22 Senators often rely on staff
for assistance in making committee decisions more than House members
do.23
Floor rules in the Senate make it easier for individual Senators to bypass
the committees and offer their policy preferences as amendments on the
floor, even if those amendments are not germane to the underlying substance
of the legislation.24 The House, on the other hand, has a strict germaneness
rule that requires all committee and floor amendments to legislation to be of
a similar subject matter to the underlying bill.25 The Senate also does not
have the equivalent of the House Rules Committee, which must approve all
legislation coming to the floor. The House Rules Committee sets the terms
of floor debate for all bills and regulates the number and source of
amendments that members can offer on the floor.26 The Senate floor is much
more freewheeling than the House. For example, the Senate has a filibuster
rule, which requires sixty votes to invoke cloture and thus end debate on any
measure subject to the filibuster.27 As Bryan Marshall and Bruce Wolpe
note, “[t]he Senate’s small size, procedural prerogatives, and growing
individualism have meant that the chamber’s committees have had less
power and have been less critical for achieving members’ goals than their
House counterparts.”28 In large part because of the ability of Senators to
18

Rohde, supra note 14, at 209–10.
ROSS K. BAKER, HOUSE & SENATE 9-11 (4TH ED. 2008).
20
Id. at 39.
21
Barbara Sinclair, The New World of U.S. Senators, CONGRESS RECONSIDERED 5
(Lawrence C. Dodd & Bruce I. Oppenheimer eds., 11th ed., 2017).
22
Id.
23
Id.
24
Id. at 9.
25
WALTER J. OLESZEK, MARK J. OLESZEK, ELIZABETH E. RYBICKI & WILLIAM A. HENIFF,
CONGRESSIONAL PROCEDURES AND THE POLICY PROCESS 211-215 (10th ed. 2015).
26
Rohde, supra note 14, at 219.
27
SARAH A. BINDER, STALEMATE: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF LEGISLATIVE
GRIDLOCK (2003).
28
BRYAN W. MARSHALL AND BRUCE C. WOLPE, THE COMMITTEE, 43 (2018).
19

MILLERMILLER ARTICLE FULLY FORMATTED (DO NOT DELETE)

212

SETON HALL LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL

4/1/2020 10:53 PM

[Vol. 44:2

bypass committees and offer their amendments directly on the floor, most
Senate committees are much weaker than the committees in the House, as is
the committee system as a whole.29
In general, committees in Congress serve various functions for the
parent chamber. From a broader institutional perspective, congressional
committees fulfill at least three different functions: drafting legislation,
reporting legislation to their respective full chambers, and having oversight
and investigatory powers.30 Senate committees, of course, have the
additional power of reviewing presidential nominations within their
respective jurisdictions.31 Congressional committees can differ greatly in
their jurisdictions, political environments, decision-making styles, and
institutional cultures.32 Given the importance of committees in both
chambers of Congress, but especially in the U.S. House of Representatives,
both chambers have made a series of institutional and structural changes to
the committee system over the years.33
Committee membership helps members fulfill various professional and
policy goals.34 Richard Fenno argued that the institution of the congressional
committee system was designed in part to meet the individual goals of
committee members such as reelection, public policy formation, power
within the chamber, and perhaps higher office.35 Fenno then created a three
category typology of congressional committees based on the primary goals
that draw members to that specific committee: reelection committees, policy
committees, and power in the chamber committees.36 “Member goals are
less easily characterized in the Senate than in the House” because of the large
number of committees on which an individual Senator serves and because
nearly all Senators can get a seat on one of the top four committees.37

29

Rohde, supra note 14, at 219.
CHRISTOPHER J. DEERING & STEVEN S. SMITH, COMMITTEES IN CONGRESS 11-12 (3RD
ED. 1997).
31
LAUREN COHEN BELL, WARRING FACTIONS: INTEREST GROUPS, MONEY, AND THE NEW
POLITICS OF SENATE CONFIRMATION 7 (2002).
32
MILLER, HIGH PRIESTS, supra note 2, at 139–40.
33
For a brief history of some of the most important changes to the committee system in
the House of Representatives, see MARSHALL & WOLPE, supra note 28, at 5–9.
34
FENNO, supra note 17.
35
FENNO, supra note 17.
36
FENNO, supra note 17. Some scholars refer to the power in the chamber committees
as influence committees or prestige committees. See DEERING & SMITH, supra note 30, at 63.
37
FENNO, supra note 17, at 78.
30
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Almost all commentators classify the two Judiciary Committees as
policy committees,38 which attract members (often lawyer-legislators)
interested in the legalistic, often court-related jurisdiction of the
committees.39 Both of these committees have been some of the most active
in their respective chambers. For instance, from 1947-1968, each committee
ranked fourth in its chamber for the largest number of roll call floor votes
held on bills originating in these committees.40 In addition, the House
Judiciary Committee has had more bills and resolutions referred to it than
any other committee in the House.41 The Judiciary Committees also hold
most of the constitutional hearings in Congress.42 For example, from 19952009, the two Judiciary Committees held seventy-two percent of the
constitutionally-based hearings (or hearings in which constitutional issues
are prevalent) in the legislative branch.43 Both the House and Senate
Judiciary Committees have a generally lawyerly decision-making culture
that is sometimes extremely partisan in nature and thus rife with conflict.44
The committees also attract the attention of a wide variety of interest
groups on all sides of the highly controversial issues under their
jurisdiction.45 Thus, some have referred to the House Judiciary Committee
like its Senate counterpart as a “national issue committee.”46 As Roger
Davidson and Oleszek explain, “[t]he Judiciary Committees are buffeted by
diverse and competing pressure groups that feel passionately on the volatile
issues such as abortion, school prayer, and gun control. The committees’
chances for achieving agreement among their members or on the floor
depend to a large extent on their ability to deflect such issues altogether or
to accommodate diverse groups through artful legislation drafting.”47 The
38

SEE, E.G., CHARLES S. BULLOCK, III, MOTIVATIONS FOR U.S. CONGRESSIONAL
COMMITTEE PREFERENCES: FRESHMEN OF THE 92ND CONGRESS, 1 LEGIS. STUDIES Q. 201-12
(1976); DEERING & SMITH, supra note 30, at 64, 73, 80, 82; F. SCOTT ADLER, WHY
CONGRESSIONAL REFORMS FAIL 54 (2002); SCOTT A. FRISCH & SEAN Q. KELLY, COMMITTEE
ASSIGNMENT POLITICS IN THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 78 (2006).
39
MILLER, THE VIEW OF THE COURTS, supra note 2, at 135.
40
GEORGE GOODWIN, JR., THE LITTLE LEGISLATURES 106 (1970).
41
ROGER H. DAVIDSON, JUDGES AND LEGISLATORS: TOWARD INSTITUTIONAL COMITY
104 (Robert A. Katzmann, ed., 1988).
42
Neal Devins, Party Polarization and Congressional Committee Considerations of
Constitutional Questions, 105 NW. U. L. REV 737, 750 (2017).
43
Id.
44
See generally MILLER, THE VIEWS OF THE COURTS, supra note 2, at 135–38
(discussing severe partisan division on the House Judiciary Committee). But see C.
LAWRENCE EVANS, LEADERSHIP IN COMMITTEE: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF LEADERSHIP
BEHAVIOR IN THE U.S. SENATE 60-66 (2001) (DISCUSSING THE VARYING EXTENT OF
PARTISANSHIP ON THE SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE).
45
GOODWIN, supra note 40, at 102.
46
GOODWIN, supra note 40, at 102.
47
ROGER H. DAVIDSON & WALTER J. OLESZEK, CONGRESS AND ITS MEMBERS 218 (9th
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fact that many of these interest groups care deeply about the decisions of the
federal courts has certainly helped shape the relationships and interactions
between the two Judiciary Committees and the judicial branch.
Today, both committees are highly partisan and extremely polarized,
even more so than their respective chambers. In the 1950s and 1960s, Senate
Democrats put an unusually large number of conservatives on the Senate
Judiciary Committee.48 Since that time, however, both the House and Senate
Judiciary Committees have usually attracted members from the ideological
extremes of each party.49 A Republican staffer for the House Judiciary
Committee explained to me in 2018 that “[t]he Committee draws more
extreme members who are especially passionate about their pet issues.”50
Neal Devins agrees with this analysis, noting, “[j]udiciary Committee
polarization is more extreme than party polarization elsewhere because the
Judiciary Committees tend to attract especially ideological lawmakers.”51
Committee assignments are handled by each party in each chamber, but
members often request assignments to particular committees.52 At times,
members were eagerly seeking membership on the Judiciary Committees,
while during other periods the Judiciary Committees became highly
unattractive. In the 1950s and 1960s, legislators saw membership on both
committees as fairly desirable.53 Writing in the late 1980s, Randall Ripley
argued that the Senate Judiciary Committee was still one of the most
attractive committee in the Senate.54 In the 1980s, however, members started
to leave the Senate Judiciary Committee.55 Chairman Joe Biden (D-DE) was
especially concerned about member recruitment to the committee after the
all-male and all-white committee voted to confirm Justice Clarence Thomas
to the Supreme Court in 1991, despite Anita Hill’s allegations of sexual
harassment against him.56 Following the 1992 elections, Biden personally
recruited the newly-elected Senator Carol Mosely-Braun (D-IL), an AfricanAmerican woman, to the committee along with the newly-elected nonlawyer Senator Diane Feinstein (D-CA).57 After spending only two years on
the Judiciary Committee, Senator Mosely-Braun quickly left the Judiciary
ed. 2004).
48
RANDALL B. RIPLEY, CONGRESS: PROCESS AND POLICY 151 (4th ed. 1988)
[HEREINAFTER RIPLEY, CONGRESS].
49
MILLER, HIGH PRIESTS, supra note 2, at 140.
50
See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
51
Devins, supra note 432, at 777.
52
RIPLEY, CONGRESS, supra note 48, at 155.
53
MORRIS OGUL, CONGRESS OVERSEES THE BUREAUCRACY 138-39 (1976).
54
RIPLEY, CONGRESS, supra note 48, at 155.
55
DEERING & SMITH, supra note 30, at 82.
56
DEERING & SMITH, supra note 30, at 82.
57
DEERING & SMITH, supra note 30, at 82.
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Committee when a spot on the Finance Committee opened up.58 Senator
Feinstein remained on the committee and currently serves as its ranking
minority member.59
On the other side of the Capitol, the House Judiciary Committee was
ranked as the seventh most desirable committee in the House during the 88th92nd Congresses (1963-1973) among the twenty standing committees then
found in the House.60 From 1961-1975, forty percent of the freshmen
members who requested the House Judiciary Committee listed it as their first
choice.61 The House Judiciary Committee, however, lost its attractiveness.
Starting in the 1970s, the House Judiciary Committee had trouble getting
enough members to fill all the seats on the committee.62 During the 93rd97th Congresses (1973-1983), the House Judiciary Committee dropped to
the thirteenth most desirable committee among the twenty regular standing
committees,63 in large part because it departed from its traditional civil rights
legislation.64 Starting in the 1980s, the party leadership in the U.S. House
had to change the rules in order to attract more Congress people to the
committee.65 The size of the committee was reduced and the rule that
required all members to be lawyers was relaxed.66 Today, the House
Committee has again become fairly large, with forty-one members serving
on it in 2019.67
The desirability of the Judiciary Committees has changed over time,
but the changes have sometimes been uneven between the two parties and
within factions of each party. Christopher Deering and Stephen Smith noted
that in the 1980s, for example, Democrats had trouble recruiting enough
members to serve on the House Judiciary Committee, while conservative
Republicans were quite interested in the committee.68 Along these same
58

DEERING & SMITH, supra note 30, at 82.
See, e.g., Press Release, Office of Senator Dianne Feinstein, Feinstein Announces
New
Judiciary
Committee
Staff
Director,
(Sept.
20,
2019),
https://www.feinstein.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/pressreleases?ContentRecord_id=24DF3C2C-F766-4E84-AD41-F4E2B41C20AA
60
Malcom Jewell & Chu Chi-Hung, Membership Movement and Committee
Attractiveness in the U.S. House of Representatives, 1963-1971, 18 AM. J. POL. SCI. 433, 438
(1974).
61
KENNETH A. SHEPSLE, THE GIANT JIGSAW PUZZLE: DEMOCRATIC COMMITTEE
ASSIGNMENTS IN THE MODERN HOUSE 46 (1978).
62
RIPLEY, CONGRESS, supra note 48, at 156.
63
Bruce A. Ray, Committee Attractiveness in the U.S. House, 1963-1981, 26 AM. J. POL.
SCI. 609, 610 (1982).
64
OGUL, supra note 53, at 151.
65
DEERING & SMITH, supra note 30, at 73; MILLER, THE VIEW OF THE COURTS, supra
note 2, at 137.
66
Ray, supra note 63, at 612.
67
See The House Judiciary Committee website at https://judiciary.house.gov/.
68
DEERING & SMITH, supra note 30, at 73.
59
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lines, in their study of the U.S. House from the early 2000s, Scott Frisch and
Sean Kelly found that newly-elected Republicans were more interested in
serving on the House Judiciary Committee than were newly-elected
Democrats.69 On the Democratic side, African-American members have
often sought out seats on the House Judiciary Committee,70 in part because
of its more recent return to its prior focus on its civil rights jurisdiction.71 In
2019, the House Judiciary Committee had eight African-American members,
two Asian-American members, and three Hispanic/Latino members among
its forty-one total membership.72 It also had thirteen female members.73
The Senate Judiciary Committee is especially reflective of the political
dynamics of its broader chamber. Thus, minority party members of the
committee use every possible procedural tactic to delay actions of the
committee with which they disagree.74 Agreeing with this assessment, a
staffer to the ranking minority member of the committee once noted, “[t]he
[Senate] Judiciary Committee is a better reflection of the Senate floor than
any other. Everybody uses their procedural rights. People divide up earlier,
and it feels like the floor. There are fights; there’s screaming and yelling;
and people filibuster in committee.”75 As a Democratic Senate staffer
summarized the situation for me in a 2017 interview, “[t]he Judiciary
Committee is less collegial than other committees in the Senate.”76
The Senate in general—and the Senate Judiciary Committee in
particular—also kill many bills that the House has endorsed, including most
of the anti-court legislation passed by the House Judiciary Committee early
in this century under Chairman Sensenbrenner (R-WI) (to be discussed in
more detail below). Comparing the two Judiciary Committees, a former
Republican staffer who worked on the Senate Judiciary Committee told me,
“[T]he Senate Judiciary Committee stops extreme measures passed by the
House because of the threat of filibusters in that chamber. The House doesn’t
have to worry about filibusters. Their members can be as extreme as they
choose to be.”77 My more recent interviews indicate that this trend is
continuing. As one former Republican Senate staffer told me in 2017, “[t]he
Senate Judiciary Committee stopped everything coming from the House.”78
As one lobbyist said in 2017, “[t]he Senate is a shield against the hyperactive
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78

FRISCH & KELLY, supra note 38, at 106.
FRISCH & KELLY, supra note 38, at 302.
MILLER, THE VIEW OF THE COURTS, supra note 2, at 136.
See The House Judiciary Committee website at https://judiciary.house.gov/.
Id.
EVANS, supra note 44, at 61–62.
EVANS, supra note 44, at 61.
See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
MILLER, THE VIEW OF THE COURTS, supra note 2, at 138.
See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
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House.”79 Marshall and Wolpe confirm this conclusion when they note,
“[w]ith the growing levels of partisanship, the contemporary Senate has
earned a reputation as a legislative graveyard.”80 The Senate Judiciary
Committee has certainly served as the legislative graveyard for anti-court
legislation passed by the House or considered by the House Judiciary
Committee.
A number of my interviewees compared the House and Senate and their
respective Judiciary Committees. As one lobbyist told me in 2018, “[t]he
Senate is slower, more moderate, and more deliberative than the House.”81
Another lobbyist told me in 2017 that she preferred working with Senate
staffers because they “were more consistent and more stable. There is too
much turnover among committee members and staff in the House.”82 Many
of my interviewees said that, traditionally, the Senate Committee was less
partisan than its House counterpart, although that norm may be changing.83
The House would also pass more extreme legislation than the Senate.84
Further, it is worth noting that since Reconstruction, seventy-eight percent
of court-curbing legislation introduced in Congress has originated in the
House, while only twenty-two percent has started in the U.S. Senate.85 Of
course, it is important to remember that very few of these bills have ever
been enacted into law.
The House Judiciary Committee has long been known for its “court like
deliberative style and lawyerlike committee culture,”86 because so many
lawyer-legislators have served on it.87 Jackie Koszczuk and Amy Stern have
described the House Judiciary Committee as a forum “where passionate and
combative oratory is generally the order of the day.”88 Despite its lawyerlike
style and culture, the House Judiciary Committee nevertheless reflects the
highly partisan and ideologically polarized nature of the broader House of
Representatives. As a lobbyist described the House committee: “The true
believers come to the House Judiciary Committee. There are bomb hurlers
on both sides of that committee.”89 A Democratic Senate staffer noted in
2017 that there is no minority voice on the House Judiciary Committee, just
79
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as there is little role for members of the minority party in the broader House
chamber.90 When asked to compare the House and Senate Judiciary
Committees, another Democratic Senate staffer told me in 2017 that, “[t]he
committee is much bigger in the House and it has a broader range of
extremists in both parties than in the Senate.”91 Another Democratic Senate
staffer explained that, “[t]he House Committee is more stage-managed than
the Senate Judiciary,” meaning the committee chair has a great deal of power
in the House, while individual Senators have a greater voice on the Senate
Committee.92 A former Democratic Senate staffer said that the Senate
Judiciary Committee gets more attention than its House counterpart because
of its role in judicial confirmations, but the House Judiciary Committee
focuses more on the substance of proposed legislation than does the Senate
Committee.93 The Judiciary Committees are also the dominant voice in
Congress on constitutional issues.94
III. JUDICIAL NOMINATIONS AND CONFIRMATIONS
Of course, one key difference between the House and Senate Judiciary
Committees is the fact that only the Senate Judiciary Committee considers
presidential nominations for the federal bench. Although the full Senate
must give its advice and consent to all presidential nominations, the process
for federal judicial nominees begins in the Senate Judiciary Committee
before going to the full Senate. As Lauren Bell has noted, “[p]residents
routinely fill more federal judgeships than any other office.”95 The House
does not play a role in confirming federal judges, so one could argue that
Senators on the Senate Judiciary Committee are more familiar with federal
judges because of the Committee’s role in the nomination process. One
might also assume that the Senate’s nomination process for federal judges
would mean that the Senate Judiciary Committee might have better
relationships with federal judges than their House Judiciary Committee
counterparts. Over the years, however, various interviewees, including
federal judges, have told me that individual judges rarely contact the Senate
Judiciary Committee or its members directly over policy issues.96 Instead,
these Senators would defer to the lobbyists who work in the Administrative
Office of the U.S. Courts who lobby on behalf of the Judicial Conference,
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the policy making arm of the federal judiciary.97 Since federal judges rarely
contact members of the House or Senate Judiciary Committees directly after
they have been confirmed, the structural differences in their roles in judicial
confirmations may not automatically translate into differences between the
two committees in their relationships with the federal courts.
Senators have often used judicial confirmation hearings as a
mechanism to send signals to the judges regarding the past rulings they
oppose and what kinds of future decisions they would like to see from the
courts. As Michael Gerhardt explains, “Senators, and presidents, employ
their authority over appointments to impress their constitutional views upon
other institutions (and the public).”98 At the hearings, Senators may ask a lot
of questions about the nominees’ views on judicial activism and other
judicial philosophies.99 Thus, the Senators are trying to figure out how the
nominees may rule on future controversies. In today’s world, most judicial
nominees refuse to give direct answers to these questions.100 In fact, the
judicial confirmation process is dreaded by many judicial nominees and the
process could have prolonged effects on future interactions between
Congress and the courts. As Ross Baker explains, “[i]n recent years, justices
of the Supreme Court have emerged badly battered from the polarized,
partisan, and contentious confirmation process in the Senate, so it would not
be surprising if they were to harbor lingering bitterness towards the
politicians who subjected them to harsh and lengthy interrogation.”101
This section will look at the confirmation process in greater detail.
Once the president nominates a judge to the federal bench for the U.S.
District Courts, the U.S. Court of Appeals, or the U.S. Supreme Court, the
nomination is then referred to the Senate Judiciary Committee. In addition
to the vetting process by the FBI102 and the American Bar Association
(“ABA”),103 the Senate Judiciary Committee staff conducts its own
investigation into the candidates, including their answers to a lengthy
questionnaire from the committee.104 Since some Republican presidents
such as President George W. Bush and President Donald Trump have viewed
the ABA as a partisan and liberal organization, they did not submit the names
97

See, e.g., MILLER, THE VIEW OF THE COURTS, supra note 2, at 26–28.
MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL APPOINTMENTS PROCESS: A CONSTITUTIONAL &
HISTORICAL ANALYSIS, xxvi (2000).
99
Id.
100
BAKER, supra note 6, at 108.
101
BAKER, supra note 6, at 107.
102
AMY STEIGERWALT, BATTLE OVER THE BENCH: SENATORS, INTEREST GROUPS, AND
LOWER COURT CONFIRMATIONS 70 (2010).
103
PAUL M. COLLINS, JR. & LORI A. RINGHAND, SUPREME COURT CONFIRMATION
HEARINGS AND CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 33 (2013).
104
BELL, supra note 31, at 36.
98

MILLERMILLER ARTICLE FULLY FORMATTED (DO NOT DELETE)

220

SETON HALL LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL

4/1/2020 10:53 PM

[Vol. 44:2

of nominees to the ABA before they submitted them to the Senate Judiciary
Committee.105 In these cases, the Committee requests ABA ratings of the
nominees after the names have been made public instead of receiving them
at the same time that the Committee receives the name of the nominee from
the White House. The GOP’s unhappiness with the ABA is somewhat
surprising, since the organization has traditionally been very conservative.
Regardless, today, most conservatives view the ABA as leaning too far
left.106 Individual members of the Judiciary Committee may also request
written answers to questions in addition to the committee questionnaire. The
Committee also seeks written information from interest groups and the
general public in its investigatory stage.107
Once the committee staff members conclude their investigation of the
nominees, the committee chair will then decide whether it will hold a hearing
on the nomination.108 Generally, the nomination dies if there is no committee
hearing.109 In addition to having almost complete control over the question
of whether or not a nominee will get a hearing, the committee chair also
controls the witness list for the hearings, including what role interest groups
will play in the hearing process.110 For example, when Senator Ted Kennedy
(D-MA) chaired the Senate Judiciary Committee from 1978-1981, interest
groups participated in a large percentage of judicial confirmation hearings.111
However, when Strom Thurmond (R-SC) took over the chairmanship from
1981-1987, interest group participation dropped dramatically.112 Under Joe
Biden’s (D-DE) stewardship from 1987-1995, interest group participation in
confirmation hearings again increased, but it dropped when Senator Orin
Hatch (R-UT) gained the chairmanship of the committee from 1995-2001.113
Thus, it appears that Democrats are more open to interest group participation
in the confirmation hearings than are Republican committee chairs.
The decision to hold a hearing for lower court nominees usually
involves the norm or tradition of Senatorial Courtesy, including the so-called
Blue Slip process explained below. Since each U.S. District Court is located
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within a specific state, Senators would invoke the norm of Senatorial
Courtesy and would refuse to vote for a nominee opposed by the home-state
Senator if the Senator was a member of the same political party as the
president. Many presidents went one step further and deferred to the
Senators of their political party and from that particular state before
nominating someone for a federal trial court opening.114 In other words,
Senators often suggested names for judicial openings in their states and many
presidents would simply nominate the Senator’s choice. This patronage
approach seemed to meet the political needs of many Senators and of many
presidents.115 For the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals, by tradition, although
not by statute, each seat belongs to a single state except for those on the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia and the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit.116 The Senate Judiciary Committee has often
deferred to the home-state Senators of the nominees about U.S. Court of
Appeals nominations as well.117
The Blue Slip process is an informal procedure governed by tradition.
Typically, the chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee would send a blue
slip of paper to each of the home-state Senators regardless of party for each
lower court judicial nominee from their state.118 The custom began as early
as 1917,119 although its modern manifestation dates from 1956.120 If the
Senator supported the nomination, then they would return the blue slip to the
committee chair.121 If they opposed the nominee, then they would either note
their opposition on the blue slip or would never return the slip to the
committee.122 When faced with opposition to a nominee from a home-state
Senator regardless of party, the chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee
would usually refuse to schedule a hearing on that nominee, effectively
killing that nomination.123 While the norm of Senatorial Courtesy seems to
have applied only to Senators from the president’s party, the
institutionalization of the blue slip tradition gave a veto to home-state
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Senators from either party.124 The blue slip process today also provides a
paper trail to track the progress of judicial nominations,125 considering that
since 2001, the chairs of the Senate Judiciary Committee have publicized
whether blue slips were returned for any given nominee.126
The issue of giving an absolute veto to home-state Senators over
judicial nominees from their states regardless of party has given rise to
different interpretations of the blue slip tradition by different Judiciary
Committee chairs. As Amy Steigerwalt notes, “[m]uch like other informal
Senate customs, a negative blue slip is only as powerful as the Senate
leadership, in this case the Judiciary Committee chair, allows it to be.”127
One of the key determinants of how a Judiciary Committee chair will
approach the blue slip process seems to be whether the Senate and the
President are controlled by the same party or different political parties.128
For many chairs of the Senate Judiciary Committee over the years, the
refusal to return a blue slip or noting opposition to a nominee on a returned
blue slip has prevented the chair from calling a hearing regarding that
nomination.129 Without a hearing, the nomination effectively dies.130
However, different Judiciary Committee chairs have interpreted the norm
differently. For example, starting in 1956, Chairman James Eastland (DMS) apparently treated a single negative blue slip or the failure to return one
as an absolute veto on the nomination.131 However, Chairman Ted Kennedy
(D-MA) changed that approach when he became chair of the committee in
1979.132 For example, in 1980, Kennedy held hearings on a nominee from
North Carolina over the objections of Senator Jessie Helms (R-NC). 133
Chairman Strom Thurmond (R-SC) ignored Democratic objections to some
of President Reagan’s lower court nominees following the 1980 election,
although he did allow Republican Senators to veto nominees for the U.S.
Court of Appeals.134 Coming to power after the 1986 elections, Chairman
Joe Biden (D-DE) often ignored the objections of his Democratic colleagues
and held hearings on Reagan and Bush nominees.135 With a Democrat in the
124
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White House, Chairman Orin Hatch (R-UT) reinstituted the blue slip veto
tradition.136 However, Hatch (R-UT) refused to follow the blue slip custom
starting in 2003 when Republicans gained unified control of the White House
and the Senate.137 At times, he held hearings on nominees even when both
home-state Democratic Senators opposed them.138 These controversial
nominations were often filibustered when they reached the Senate floor.139
In 2005, Chairman Arlen Specter (R-PA) returned to the single Senator veto
practice on blue slips.140
When Democrat Chairman Patrick Leahy (D-VT) took control of the
committee in 2001, and again in 2007, he instituted a rule that one negative
blue slip would slow down a nomination and two negative blue slips would
kill it.141 Chairman Chuck Grassley (R-IA) followed this same practice
during the Obama administration.142 After President Trump’s election, and
under considerable pressure from Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell
(R-KY) and other prominent conservatives, Grassley announced a new blue
slip policy that, for the first time, would treat U.S. Court of Appeals
nominees differently than those nominated for the U.S. District Courts.143
Grassley said he would likely honor a single negative blue slip for a district
court nominee, but not for a circuit court nominee because the circuit courts
cover multiple states and are more important nationally.144 Grassley held
hearings on a variety of Trump appellate nominees despite the fact that one
home-state Senator objected.145 In 2019, new Judiciary Committee
Chairman Lindsey Graham (R-SC) went a step further, stating that, “[t]he
blue slip process for circuit judges are [sic] not gonna [sic] be allowed to
become a veto.”146 In February of 2019, the Senate confirmed a Ninth
Circuit nominee even though both home-state Senators refused to return their
blue slips.147 It was the first time in history that the Senate had confirmed a
federal judge over the opposition of both home-state Senators.148
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On the other hand, nominations to the U.S. Supreme Court have always
been politicized.149 Since 1939, almost all presidential nominees for the U.S.
Supreme Court have faced confirmation hearings before the Senate Judiciary
Committee.150 While many commentators question the value of these
Supreme Court confirmation hearings, others note that the hearings are a
clear public forum for Senators and others to send clear messages to the
nominees about important issues of constitutional and statutory
interpretation.151 In other words, the confirmation hearings are clear
signaling devices in the institutional dialogue between Congress and the
federal courts regarding judicial decisions.152 Supreme Court nominees do
not face the blue slip process. Nevertheless, the Committee chair has a great
deal of discretion about whether or when to schedule confirmation hearings
for the nominee.153 For example, Senator Majority Leader Mitch McConnell
(R-KY) refused to allow Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman Grassley (RIA) to hold hearings on President Obama’s nomination of Judge Merrick
Garland to the U.S. Supreme Court in 2016.154 McConnell argued that the
Senate should not consider a Supreme Court nominee during a presidential
election year.155 McConnell’s role in halting the committee hearings for
Judge Garland was confirmed in many of my more recent interviews.156
Traditionally, the Senate would easily confirm the vast majority of the
President’s nominees for federal judgeships at all levels. In fact, before the
1980’s, the Senate confirmed about ninety percent of presidential judicial
nominees.157 High confirmation rates were especially true for lower court
nominations, although Supreme Court nominees have historically received
more scrutiny from the Senate.158 The notable exceptions to presidential
149
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success in judicial nominations were, for example, when a coalition of
Republicans and conservative Democrats successfully filibustered the
nomination of Abe Fortas to be Chief Justice in 1968 and when the Senate
rejected President Nixon’s nominations to the Supreme Court of Clement
Haynsworth and G. Harold Carswell in 1969 and 1970, respectively.159
Many commentators point to the rejection of President Reagan’s nomination
of Judge Robert Bork to the U.S. Supreme Court in 1987 and the role of
interest groups in that fight as the start of the modern era of highly contested
judicial nominations in the U.S. Senate.160 As a result, between 1981 and
2014, the percentage of judicial confirmations dropped to about sixty-five
percent.161 Recently, interest groups have become more involved in all
judicial nominations, including those for the lower federal courts.162 This
heightened interest group involvement has clearly changed the nomination
and confirmation processes for lower federal judgeships.163
Evidence of this new era is demonstrated by the fact that the Senate
filibustered or otherwise delayed a variety of Clinton, George W. Bush,164
and eventually Obama nominations165 to the federal bench. Thus, as the
Senate has grown more ideologically polarized, the confirmation process has
also become more contentious and more partisan in nature. As Barbara
Sinclair notes, “[p]arty polarization has made the confirmation process an
increasingly confrontational one.”166 The same ideological and interest
group battles over legislation in the Senate have carried over to its
confirmation of presidential appointees.167 As Bell has argued, “the Senate’s
confirmation process has become little more than an extension of its
legislative work.”168
In the full Senate, the motion to consider a presidential nomination is
not debatable, but the motion to approve the nomination is.169 Therefore, for
an extended period in the history of the Senate, all presidential nominations,

159

MICHAEL COMISKEY, SEEKING JUSTICES: THE JUDGING OF SUPREME COURT NOMINEES
66-68 (2004).
160
MALTESE, supra note 114, at 7–8; BINDER & MALTZMAN, supra note 118, at 7–8.
161
SARAH BINDER & FORREST MALTZMAN, IS ADVICE AND CONSENT BROKEN? THE
CONTENTIOUS POLITICS OF CONFIRMING FEDERAL JUDGES AND JUSTICES, IN CONGRESS
RECONSIDERED 402-03 (2016).
162
See generally BELL, supra note 31.
163
See generally BELL, supra note 31.
164
BINDER & MALTZMAN, supra note 118, at 4.
165
BINDER & MALTZMAN, supra note 161, AT 399–400.
166
BARBARA SINCLAIR, UNORTHODOX LAWMAKING: NEW LEGISLATIVE PROCESSES IN THE
U.S. CONGRESS 61 (5TH ED. 2017).
167
See BELL, supra note 31, at ix.
168
See BELL, supra note 31, at ix.
169
SINCLAIR, supra note 166, at 61.

MILLERMILLER ARTICLE FULLY FORMATTED (DO NOT DELETE)

226

SETON HALL LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL

4/1/2020 10:53 PM

[Vol. 44:2

including judicial nominations, were subject to the filibuster.170 This
changed in 2013 when the Democratically controlled Senate invoked the socalled “nuclear option” and eliminated the filibuster for many executive
branch nominees and for lower federal court nominees.171 In 2017, the
Republican controlled Senate then eliminated the filibuster for U.S. Supreme
Court nominees in order to get then Judge Neil Gorsuch confirmed to the
high court.172
Aside from the notable battles over nominees to the U.S. Supreme
Court, most of the modern judicial confirmation fights involved
controversial nominations to the U.S. Courts of Appeals.173 However, during
the Obama Administration, Republican Senators took the conflict to a new
level when they filibustered judicial nominees for the first time who were
supported by their Republican home-state colleagues.174 In addition, for the
first time, a nomination to the U.S. District Court was almost blocked by a
successful filibuster in 2011 during the Obama Administration.175
According to one Democratic Senate aide speaking in 2011, “[the GOP] have
approached district court nominees with the same exacting inquiry standards
that used to be reserved for the Supreme Court and for controversial circuit
court nominees. But now it extends to every lifetime appointment.”176
IV. ROUTINE AND NON-ROUTINE INTERACTIONS BETWEEN CONGRESS AND
THE COURTS
In overall terms, sometimes the relationship between Congress and the
federal courts is cooperative and sometimes it is highly contentious. It is
quite routine for politicians to criticize court decisions with which they
disagree, but it is much less common for Congress as a whole to curb the
judicial branch’s institutional powers. Interest groups often urge politicians
to take issue with particular judicial decisions, and the politicians find this
criticism to be an easy way to score points with those who are unhappy with
a specific court ruling. The introduction of court-curbing legislation may
also be a low-cost signaling device, allowing politicians to express their
displeasure with the courts and/or with specific court decisions, since they
know that there is not a high probability that these measures will actually
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become law.177 As Stephen Engel concludes, “[p]olitical attacks on the
federal courts that do not result in undermining judicial power could be a
win-win for all sides.”178
The Constitution protects the independence of federal judges by giving
them life terms and by prohibiting Congress from reducing their salaries.179
Of course, this does not mean that Congress must give the judges annual cost
of living increases or otherwise increase their incomes. However, when
Congress is unhappy with the federal courts it has a variety of weapons it can
use to attack judicial power.180 These include overturning statutory
interpretation decisions of the courts by passing a new statute, passing
constitutional amendments meant to overturn the courts’ constitutionallybased decisions (although at times Congress has enacted mere statutes that
were intended to overturn constitutional decisions), restricting the budgets
and salaries of the federal courts, changing the structure and/or number of
judges on specific courts, restricting the courts’ jurisdiction, creating an
Inspector General for the judiciary, and impeaching federal judges.181
Congress, of course, can ignore a judicial decision with which it disagrees.182
When Congress does attempt to curb the courts, it often does so through the
two Judiciary Committees.183
There are some routine interactions between Congress and the courts
that receive very little scholarly or other attention and are therefore usually
non-conflictual. For example, Congress seems to regularly pass deliberately
ambiguous statutes, knowing that the courts will probably fix them.184
Congress may also want to shift various issues to the courts in an attempt to
protect these policies from future unsympathetic voters and legislators. As
Pickerill explains, “Elected officials might also want to empower courts as a
way of entrenching policies and programs that they believe are becoming
vulnerable to new or emerging electoral majorities.”185 On the other hand,
the Supreme Court and other federal courts routinely invite Congress to
177
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overturn their statutory interpretation decisions if the current majority in
Congress might disagree with the judicial pronouncement.186 Sometimes
these invitations to override come directly from the dissent.187 These
interactions therefore do not produce much friction between the branches.
As Pickerill has noted, “[t]hose who expect a constitutional revolution, a
constitutional moment, or other form of severe confrontation between the
Court and Congress simply do not appreciate the more routine and typical
type of interaction between the Court and Congress in the political
process.”188
Some of the routine interactions between Congress and the courts are
based on the fact that Congress must approve annual appropriations for the
federal judiciary.189 These appropriations include funding for construction
of new federal courthouses, for staff salaries, for technology and security
needs, for judicial libraries, and for other operating expenses.190 These
budget issues can also involve salaries for federal judges.191 Although
individual legislators have often threatened to use congressional budget
powers against the federal courts in order to retaliate for judicial decisions
that they do not like,192 Congress as a whole has rarely done so.
Nevertheless, the annual budget process does provide the prospect of conflict
between Congress and the courts. As I have written previously, “[t]he annual
appropriations process provides a clear avenue to see the different
institutional perspectives of the [federal courts] and of Congress. The courts
rightly see themselves as an independent third branch and many judges seem
to resent Congress’s interference with their budget requests.”193 Congress,
on the other hand, “often views the federal courts as just one more federal
agency begging for funds.”194 These routine interactions between the courts
and Congress may appear to be conflictual, but generally are not. As George
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Lovell has written, “the appearance of conflict between independent
branches frequently masks more cooperative interaction between
interdependent branches.”195
The exceptions to this norm of budgetary comity between the two
institutions stand out. For example, in 1964 Congress granted twice the
annual cost of living increase for lower court federal judicial salaries as they
did for the justices of the U.S. Supreme Court in order to signal their
dissatisfaction with various rulings from the high court.196 Nevertheless,
some politicians have still clamored for Congress to use its budgetary powers
against the courts. For example, in 2005 the then Majority Leader of the
House Tom DeLay (R-TX) bellowed, “[w]e set up the courts. We can unset
the courts. We have the power of the purse.”197 At about the same time,
Representative Steve King (R-IA), then a member of the House Judiciary
Committee, expressed his frustration with the federal courts by proclaiming,
“[w]hen their budget starts to dry up, we’ll get their attention.”198
At other times, the interactions between the two branches are less
routine in part because Congress ultimately decides how to structure the
federal courts and their jurisdictions. Congress decides how many judges
will serve on each U.S. District Court, the U.S. Courts of Appeals, and the
U.S. Supreme Court. For example, in 1977, 1984, and in 1990, Congress
greatly expanded the number of judgeships on the U.S. District Courts,
suddenly giving the president many more judicial nominations than his
predecessors.199 The policymaking arm of the federal judiciary, the Judicial
Conference, makes recommendations on the courts that require additional
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judges,200 but Congress often ignores those suggestions.201 Congress also
determines the boundaries of the U.S. Courts of Appeals, occasionally
redrawing those boundaries for workload or ideological reasons. For
example, following the lead of its Judiciary Committees, Congress in 1980
split the old Fifth Circuit and moved the states of Florida, Georgia, and
Alabama to the new Eleventh Circuit for both political and management
reasons.202 Today, many conservatives would like to split the current Ninth
Circuit because of its perceived liberal decisions.203 When Republicans
controlled the House Judiciary Committee, that committee held various
hearings over the years on the issue, as did the Senate Judiciary
Committee.204 Congress also sets the number of justices on the U.S.
Supreme Court, and historically Congress has altered the number of justices
to fit its political needs at the time. 205 Notably, Congress refused to enact
Franklin Roosevelt’s Court Packing Plan, in part because it seems that
having nine justices on the Supreme Court has become constitutionalized in
the American voters’ minds.206
Because the House has no role in judicial confirmations, some argue
that the House Judiciary Committee pays extra attention to the issue of how
many judges should serve on the U.S. District Courts and other federal
courts. As Binder and Maltzman have argued:
From the vantage of the House, legislators have
constitutional authority to make decisions about the
structure of the bench, but not about who sits on the
bench. . . . Regardless of whether party control is unified or
divided, the creation of new judgeships provides an
electorally valuable opportunity for credit claiming. Even if
new judgeships are not created within one’s state or district,
200
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House members can claim credit for acting to improve the
efficiency of the courts.207
Interestingly, Binder and Maltzman conclude that in the House Judiciary
Committee, new judgeships are created to benefit representatives from both
political parties and to allow both parties to claim credit, while the Senate
Judiciary Committee prefers to give more judgeships to states represented
on the Committee by members of the president’s political party.208
There have been various periods throughout history when the conflicts
between the federal courts and the elected branches have been more
pronounced. President Thomas Jefferson and his Democratic-Republican
Party allies in Congress believed that a life term for federal judges
maintained the Federalist Party policies that Jefferson’s election seemed to
repudiate. As Charles Geyh has written, “[t]he election of Thomas Jefferson
ushered in the first sustained wave of national anger directed at federal
judges.”209 The Jeffersonians in Congress promptly eliminated sixteen new
judgeships for the federal circuit courts that the Federalists had hastily
created before they lost power in Congress (the so-called Midnight
Judges),210 and they further prevented the Supreme Court from meeting for
one year.211 The Supreme Court acquiesced to these actions. The
Jeffersonians then attempted to impeach federal judges (including Supreme
Court justices) who they felt were too strongly partisan members of the
Federalist Party. The Senate refused to remove most of these judges from
office, including Justice Samuel Chase, thus setting the precedent that
federal judges would not be removed from the bench merely because of their
rulings.212 President Andrew Jackson was also no friend of the federal courts
and preferred to ignore the courts when they made rulings with which he did
not agree. Although apocryphal, he is often quoted as saying in response to
the Supreme Court’s unpopular ruling in Worcester v. Georgia,213 “John
Marshall has made his decision, now let him enforce it.”214
President Lincoln vowed never to allow judges to get in the way of his
mission to save the Union during the Civil War. In attacking the authority
of the highest court in the country, Lincoln said, “[t]he candid citizen must
confess that if the policy of the Government upon vital questions affecting
207
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the whole people is to be irrevocably fixed by decisions of the Supreme
Court . . . the people will have ceased to be their own rulers.”215 After the
Civil War, the Radical Republicans in Congress changed the number of
justices on the U.S. Supreme Court several times to meet their political
needs, expanding it to ten during the Lincoln presidency and then reducing
the Court to seven members in the Johnson Administration in order to
prevent the Democratic president from replacing several retiring justices.216
They also prevented the Court from hearing cases in which the justices might
have declared Reconstruction to be unconstitutional.217
Coming from the left, the Populists and Progressives in Congress
routinely attacked the legitimacy of the conservative activist U.S. Supreme
Court and other federal courts in the late 1800’s and the early 1900’s.218
These groups advocated reforms to reduce judicial power, which included:
requiring the popular election of federal judges, allowing Congress to
overturn Supreme Court rulings with a two-thirds vote, requiring the vote of
seven justices before a law could be declared unconstitutional, and ending
life terms for federal judges by instituting voter recall provisions.219 Senator
Robert La Follette, running for president in 1924 as the Progressive Party
candidate, called federal judges “petty tyrants and arrogant despots.”220
Along these same lines, President Theodore Roosevelt once said that, “I may
not know much law, but I do know that one can put the fear of God in
judges.”221 And, of course, President Franklin Roosevelt was so unhappy
with the Supreme Court declaring his New Deal programs to be
unconstitutional that he proposed his infamous “Court Packing Plan” in
order to almost double the size of the Court and allow him to appoint a
majority of the justices.222 Congress refused to enact this proposal, but they
did pass an early retirement program that gave Roosevelt enough
appointments to place his allies to control the Court’s majority.223
Since the 1950s, conservative politicians and the interest groups
supporting them have routinely attacked the federal courts because of their
perceived liberal bias.224 Conservatives were especially upset with the
215
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liberal activism of the Warren Court and often called for Chief Justice
Warren to be impeached.225 In 1964, Senator Barry Goldwater (R-AZ), the
Republican candidate for president, made the judiciary a significant
campaign issue.226 In 1968, while running for president, Richard Nixon
made “law and order” and attacks on liberal activist judges central themes in
his campaign.227 In 1970, then Minority Leader of the U.S. House,
Representative Gerald Ford (R-MI) called for the impeachment of Justice
William O. Douglas, at least in part because of his liberal views.228 In his
1980 and 1984 campaigns for president, Ronald Reagan also made attacks
on the federal courts an important campaign issue.229
In fact, all of the Republican Party platforms since 1976 have made
negative statements about the federal judiciary, with some members even
calling for Congress to enact court-stripping or jurisdiction stripping
legislation against the federal courts.230 On the other hand, the platforms of
the Democratic Party did not include any such anti-court references in the
same time period.231 Conservative opposition to the courts continues today.
When running for president in 2016, Senator Ted Cruz (R-TX), a member of
the Senate Judiciary Committee, supported a variety of proposals advanced
by the Religious Right to curb the power of the courts, including ending life
terms by imposing retention elections for U.S. Supreme Court justices.232
Senator Cruz said, “[t]o see the court behaving as it is today, as a superlegislature, simply enacting the policy preferences of the elite judges who
are serving upon it, is a profound betrayal of their judicial oaths of office and
of the constitutional design that has protected our liberty for over two
centuries.”233 President Donald Trump has routinely attacked federal judges
in highly personal ways when they issued decisions with which he
disagreed.234 For example, President Trump complained that U.S. District
Judge Gonzalo Curiel could not remain impartial in a fraud case dealing with
Trump University because of his Mexican heritage.235 The President also
225
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criticized U.S. District Judge Amy Berman Jackson’s handling of the
criminal case of his friend, Roger Stone.236 Trump also called for Justices
Sotomayor and Ginsburg to recuse themselves from any cases about the
president or his personal finances in part because of their criticism of the
Trump Administration’s legal strategy.237
The early 2000s seemed to be the low point in the inter-institutional
relationship between Congress and the federal courts. During interviews I
conducted in 2006 before the midterm elections, I heard this relationship
described as “venomous,” “hostile,” “tense,” “deteriorating,” “contentious,”
“animosity,” “strained,” and “adversarial.”238
One liberal U.S.
Representative told me that, “[t]he relationship between the Congress and
the federal courts is at an all-time low.”239 The same year, another liberal
Member of Congress told me, “[t]here is less respect for the independence
of the courts today.”240 In his research, Clark found the period between
2001-2008 was one of the highest in modern history for the introduction of
court-curbing legislation in Congress.241 About the same time, Baker
described the inter-institutional relationship among the judicial and
legislative branches as, “mutual wariness, suspicion, jealousy, and even a bit
of spite.”242
Even Justice Sandra Day O’Connor agreed with these concerns, stating
in 2004 that the relationship between Congress and the federal courts was
“more tense than at any time in my lifetime.”243 Justice Ginsburg agreed,
stating that the judiciary was “under assault in a way that I haven’t seen
before.”244 In 2005, Newsweek ran a story entitled, “The War on Judges,”
which concluded that, “concern over the rising tide of anti-judge rhetoric has
rocked even the Supreme Court. Though judges were pulled into the culture
wars before, lately the animosity—and a range of new efforts to curb judicial
power—have reached fever pitch.”245 As Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote in
his 2004 annual report, “[c]riticism of judges has dramatically increased in
recent years, exacerbating in some respects the strained relationship between
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the Congress and the federal judiciary.”246 Summarizing the alarm that many
felt about the increased attacks on the judiciary during this period, Geyh
concluded that, “[s]ome have likened the relationship between courts and
Congress to a conversation or dialogue, but such measured and civil
exchanges do not capture the rough and tumble of the interaction in its
ordinary course the way a schoolyard fracas does.”247
During this period, Congress expressed its displeasure with the federal
courts in various ways. For example, the House and Senate Judiciary
Committees held a variety of hearings to express their displeasure with
federal judges, some of which were aimed at attacking specific court
decisions such as the one in Kelo v. City of New London (2005), where the
Supreme Court ruled that local governments had the right to define the
phrase “public use” in the Taking Clause of the Fifth Amendment.248 In a
2005 hearing before a House Judiciary Committee subcommittee,
Representative Tom Feeney (R-FL) said that the Kelo decision was
“indicative of the larger trend in the Court to substitute their own prejudices
and biases for the constitutional language itself.”249 Speaking as a supporter
of the Religious Right, Feeney went on to call for Congress to examine the
religious faith of any nominee to the high court.250 Earlier in his
congressional career, Feeney authored an amendment on the House floor
requiring the Department of Justice to monitor individual federal judges who
deviated from the federal criminal sentencing guidelines.251 The ABA, the
American Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”), and even Chief Justice
Rehnquist strongly opposed Feeney’s amendment.252 As I have written
previously, “[f]ederal judges saw this move as a clear attack on judicial
independence, because they perceived that the next step was impeachment
for federal trial judges who deviated from the guidelines.”253
Sometimes the hearings took on broader topics, like the use of foreign
court decisions as persuasive precedent in American courts.254 Various
politicians and interest groups called for the impeachment of any judges who
246
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cited foreign judicial decisions in any form.255 As one interest group
spokesperson for a Religious Right group stated in 2005 at a conference
entitled, “Remedies to Judicial Tyranny,” “if about forty [federal judges] get
impeached, suddenly a lot of these guys would be retiring.”256 Although
Congress has never removed a federal judge merely for their political views
or for their judicial rulings, the threat of impeachment remains a weapon
some would like to use against federal judges with whom they disagree. The
standards for impeachment are not clear. For example, in advocating for the
impeachment of Justice William O. Douglas, then House Minority Leader
Gerald Ford (R-MI) argued that an “impeachable offense is whatever a
majority of the House of Representatives considers it to be at any given
moment in history.”257
An angry Congress may also prevent the federal courts from hearing
certain types of cases through a process known as jurisdiction stripping, or
court-stripping.258 Congress creates federal court jurisdiction, and many
argue that the legislative branch can also take this jurisdiction away. During
Reconstruction, Congress was successful in stripping the Supreme Court of
jurisdiction in some cases such as Ex Parte McCardle (1869).259
Notwithstanding, the Court rejected similar attempts in United States v.
Klein (1872).260 Thus, the limits on the power of Congress to strip the federal
courts of jurisdiction remain unclear. Nonetheless, in the late 1800s and
early 1900s, Progressives and Populists called for the legislative branch to
enact court-stripping legislation, similar to what conservatives have done
since the 1950s, because of their perception that the Supreme Court had
become a liberal activist court.261 When Congress included court-stripping
provisions in the Military Commissions Act of 2006, the Supreme Court
promptly ignored them and declared portions of the underlying act
unconstitutional.262
Although conceptually different from court-stripping, the House
Judiciary Committee in 2006 did pass another attack on the federal courts
when it approved a bill to create an Inspector General for the federal courts.
Inspectors General have long served in the executive branch, auditing the
actions and expenditures of their federal agencies and departments, and
255
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reporting their conclusions directly to Congress.263 The proposed judiciary
Inspector General legislation was strongly opposed by federal judges and
others, who saw it as another attempt to promote the impeachment of judges
with whom the conservatives disagreed.264 The bill was not considered by
the full House nor by the Senate Judiciary Committee.265 As I have written
previously, “[h]aving an inspector general for the federal judiciary would
skew the continuing dialogue between Congress and the courts, as well as
potentially harm both the institutional and the decisional independence of the
judiciary.”266
The Religious Right and/or the Tea Party Movement prompted many
of the attacks on the judiciary during this time period.267 Both movements
and the interest groups associated with them comprised important parts of
the Republican coalition.268 Geyh summarized the views of the Religious
Right regarding the role of judges in our society in this way: “[f]or this new
breed of Christian conservative, natural law trumps all, and judges who are
serious about the rule of law should interpret and apply constitutional,
statutory, and common law in a manner consistent with the higher teachings
of God.”269 Thus, conservatives seemed to care much more about judicial
appointments than did liberals.270 As one Democratic staffer in the U.S.
Senate told me in a 2017 interview, the strong support from evangelicals and
others in the Religious Right and President Trump’s election have seemed to
end the conservative attacks on the federal courts.271 Many of my
interviewees over the years have explained that conservatives care much
more about the federal courts than do liberals, and conservatives were
leading the charge against the federal courts in the early part of this
century.272 As a former Democratic Senate staffer told me in 2017, “[t]he
GOP leadership pushes hard on judges because the Republican base makes
263
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judicial confirmations a high priority. On the left, however, voters don’t
connect judges with policy.”273
Others have argued that alarm over the tense relationship between the
courts and Congress at the beginning of the current century was overblown,
in large part because Congress as a whole took very little action to restrict
judicial power, despite all of the anti-court rhetoric coming from various
members of the legislative branch.274 Therefore, Pickerilll concluded that,
“[w]hile a number of attacks on the courts may seem ill-advised and
impolitic, they do not constitute a serious threat to the U.S. judiciary.”275
Summarizing much of this line of argument, Geyh concluded that,
“[a]lthough Congress has threatened the judiciary’s independence on any
number of occasions, it has rarely made good on those threats.”276 David
O’Brien agreed, noting that efforts to restrict the power of the federal courts
in general and the Supreme Court in particular have very rarely been enacted,
and thus “[c]ourt-curbing legislation is not a very effective weapon . . . .
Most proposals to curb the Court, of course, are simply that.”277
Many scholars have long felt that broad public support for the work of
the federal courts has protected them from many of these institutional
attacks.278 O’Brien refers to this as the “myth of the cult of the robe.”279
Geyh argues that the courts are protected from the most dangerous
institutional attacks because over the years, Congress and the courts have
reached a “dynamic equilibrium” that favors judicial independence.280 Even
in the current era of extreme political polarization, the federal courts still
have higher levels of public support than do the other branches of
government. In fact, in a 2017 public opinion survey about trust in
government, individuals expressed higher levels of trust for the courts than
those who trusted either of the other two branches combined.281 As Neal
Devins and Lawrence Baum have concluded, “[p]olitical polarization, in
other words, has fueled a general decline in support for all governmental
actors; it has not eroded the Court’s advantage over the other branches in
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public approval.”282
One question is whether federal judges, including U.S. Supreme Court
justices, alter their decisions in the face of expected congressional
opposition. Clark argues that the Supreme Court does not worry very much
about congressional attacks themselves, but instead the justices see these
attacks as evidence that their public support (as opposed to their elite
support) may be weakening. Clark concludes, “the bulk of empirical
evidence suggests that the Supreme Court is not at all influenced by
congressional ideology . . . . [However], the justices interpret Court-curbing
threats as signals about the nature of its public support.”283 Thus, courtcurbing legislation serves as an important mechanism for judges to learn
about their relationship with the general public.284 Devins and Baum
disagree with this notion that the Supreme Court follows public opinion,
instead arguing that, “[t]he Justices are more responsive to relevant segments
of the social and political elite than to the public as a whole.”285
V. THE COMMITTEES OF LAWYERS
The Judiciary Committees have traditionally been the committees of
lawyers. In their longitudinal study of the committee assignment process in
the U.S. House from WWII to the early 2000’s, Frisch and Kelly found that,
“[l]awyers, regardless of party or electoral status, are likely to request
assignment to Judiciary.”286 The parties generally obliged to these requests,
and only lawyers were appointed to the committees for many years.287 In
1989-1990, thirty-four of the thirty-five members of the House Judiciary
Committee were lawyers.288
The trend continued in 1995, when
Congressman Sonny Bono (R-CA) was the only non-lawyer to serve on the
House Judiciary Committee that year.289 Following his death, his wife Mary
Bono (R-CA), was the sole non-lawyer on the committee.290 As a result,
both committees developed a lawyerlike and incrementalistic deliberative
style and culture.
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Clearly, lawyer-politicians today continue to be greatly overrepresented among the membership of both Judiciary Committees.291 At the
end of the 115th Congress (2017-2018), there were 167 voting members with
law degrees in the full House (37.8%) and fifty-five (55) Senators.292 But,
in July of 2017, the House Judiciary Committee had only eight non-lawyers
among the forty members (eighty percent lawyers), and the Senate Judiciary
Committee had only six non-lawyers among its twenty members (seventy
percent lawyers).293 In July of 2018, the number of non-lawyers on the
House Judiciary Committee was nine (seventy-eight percent lawyers), but
the Senate Judiciary Committee had only four non-lawyers among its
twenty-one members (eighty-one percent lawyers).294 In June of 2019, the
Congressional Research Service reported that 161 House members in the full
House were lawyers (36.6% lawyers) and fifty-three Senators had law
degrees (fifty-three percent lawyers).295 In July of 2019, on the Senate
Judiciary Committee, seventy-seven percent of the members were lawyers,
while lawyers made up eighty percent of the membership of the House
Judiciary Committee.296 On both committees, the non-lawyers were often
female.297 For example, in 2019, on the Senate Judiciary Committee, three
of the five non-lawyers were women (with one male non-lawyer holding a
Ph.D. instead of a law degree).298
Many of my interviewees have highlighted the fact that the two
Judiciary Committees attract especially high-quality lawyer-legislators. As
one U.S. Representative told me in 1989, “[i]t’s great to work with all those
lawyers on [House] Judiciary. The members have more experience and are
higher quality than most.
They are also brighter than most.”299
Congressional staffers on the House Judiciary Committee are almost always
lawyers themselves have told me over the years that they preferred working
291
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with lawyer members of the committee.300 As one staffer explained in an
interview in 1989, “Because of their training and discipline, lawyer members
see the importance of nuance and wording. They also ask tougher questions
of witnesses.”301 In 2006, stressing the importance of having liberal lawyerlegislators on the Judiciary Committee, one U.S. Representative told me that,
“[t]he conservatives don’t understand the courts and the legal ideology of the
courts very well. They don’t really know the impact of the opinions of the
courts, and they don’t bother to try to understand judicial rulings. They just
attack the courts. Lawyers [on the committee] must stand up for the courts
when they can’t stand up for themselves.”302
Even the non-lawyer members of the two Judiciary Committees
eventually learn to navigate the committees’ lawyerlike and incrementalistic
cultures. In 2018, a Republican lawyer who worked as a staffer for a GOP
member of the House Judiciary Committee told me, “[t]here aren’t a lot of
differences between the lawyer and non-lawyer members. The lawyers and
non-lawyers on the committee use the same language. The non-lawyers
learn to talk like lawyers. Newer non-lawyers on the committee who haven’t
yet adapted are more obvious.”303 Another lobbyist told me, “Senator
Feinstein, the ranking minority member of the Judiciary Committee, is one
of the best lawyers on the committee.”304 The statement was, of course,
meant to be ironic because Senator Feinstein is one of the few members of
the Senate Committee who does not have a law degree, and the lobbyist was
fully aware of that fact.
On the other hand, sometimes the differences between the lawyerpoliticians and the non-lawyers on the committees are more obvious. In
2017, a former Democratic staffer on the Senate Judiciary Committee noted
in an interview with me that, “[i]t is quite obvious that Chairman Grassley
and Ranking Member Feinstein are not lawyers. It is quite odd to have nonlawyers as both the chair and the ranking member.”305 This staffer went on
to note that it was easy to tell which members of the Senate Committee were
lawyers because they often highlighted that fact in their public comments.306
In 2017, a different Democratic Senate staffer told me that his boss “loves
being a lawyer,” mentions that fact quite often, and has even continued
writing law review articles after his election to the Senate.307 Not everyone
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wants the committees to be made up exclusively of lawyers. For example,
in 2017, a former Democratic Senate staffer told me that, “[s]ometimes it is
quite useful to have a non-lawyer perspective on the Committee.”308
In my early research, lawyer members of the House and especially
those lawyers who served on the House Judiciary Committee were extremely
protective of the courts.309 In 1989, one House Judiciary Committee staffer
explained why he felt the committee was extremely supportive of the third
branch. He said, “[j]ust like one can disagree with different schools of
thought among legal scholars or other academics, Judiciary members
disagree with the courts without attacking the courts as an institution. When
Judiciary members disagree with a court’s decision, they don’t call for the
impeachment of the judge; they file amicus briefs for the appeal.”310 Things
had changed quite a bit when I conduced my next round of interviews in
2006-2007. Under Chairman Jim Sensenbrenner (R-WI), the conservative
lawyers on the House Judiciary Committee led the charge against the federal
courts. For example, writing in 2006, Bell and Kevin Scott found that House
Judiciary Committee members were just as likely to introduce courtstripping legislation as were their colleagues who did not serve on that
committee.311 These scholars also found that lawyers in the House were just
as likely to introduce court-curbing legislation as were their non-lawyer
colleagues.312 As an employee of the judicial branch told me in 2006, “[t]he
days when we could count on lawyers in the House to protect judicial
independence are long over. Today ideology and party matter much more
than whether a member has a law degree.”313
Not everyone was happy that there were so many non-lawyers serving
in key roles on the Senate Judiciary Committee. In 2018, one lobbyist was
quite critical of Senator Chuck Grassley (R-IA), the former chair of the
Committee. This lobbyist stated, “[a]s a non-lawyer, Grassley is unaware of
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the process used in the Judicial Conference to make policy.”314 In an
interview with me in 2018, an employee of a think tank was equally critical
of Senator Grassley’s approach to the judiciary, noting that, “Grassley only
has a vague conception of what courts do. Everything with Grassley is
personal, and he has a great deal of antagonism toward federal judges.” 315
This person continued, “[a]s a non-lawyer, Grassley doesn’t understand how
the court system actually functions.”316 In 2017, a Democratic Senate staffer
was more subtle in his criticism of the chairman when he told me, “Grassley
is a non-lawyer, and certain issues matter more to him and matter differently
than to the lawyer members on the committee.”317 Another Democratic
staffer told me that, “[t]he non-lawyer members of the committee rely more
on the lawyers on their staff than the lawyer members do.”318
Both Senator Grassley and former House Judiciary Chair Jim
Sensenbrenner (R-WI) are often critical of the federal courts. For instance,
both Senator Grassley and Jim Sensenbrenner (R-WI) have introduced anticourt legislation to create an Inspector General for the federal judiciary who
would report back directly to Congress.319 In the press release that notes the
introduction of the bill, the Senator stated, “[i]t’s been shown through press
accounts and various reports that the federal judiciary is in need of some
sunshine. An Inspector General can only help shed more light on the actions
of the Judicial Branch and keep it accountable to the American people.”320
In 2006, although the legislation passed the House Judiciary Committee, the
Senate Committee has never considered it.321 However, in June 2018, during
a hearing on sexual harassment in the judiciary, Senator Grassley again
called for the creation of an Inspector General for the federal courts.322
Grassley, however, unlike Chairman Sensenbrenner of the House Judiciary
Committee, did not bring the legislation to a mark-up in the committee, even
though he could have because of his position as committee chair. Speaking
to me in 2017, another lobbyist explained that, “Grassley wants comity and
collegiality, and thus he won’t push anti-court legislation in the
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committee.”323
VI. THE ROLE OF THE COMMITTEE CHAIR
The leader of a congressional committee at any specific time can have
a huge effect on the approach and agenda of that committee and its
relationship with the federal courts. In his study of various committee chairs,
Andrees Reeves argued that the “[individual] chairmen made a difference in
the structure, operations, output, and function of the committee, each leading
in a different way. While institutional environmental influences leadership,
the way the chairman uses the resources at hand—both institutional
prerogatives and personal resources—also has an impact on the institution
and its outputs. In large part as a result of the differences in leadership, the
committee was a different organization under each chairman.”324 In other
words, who the committee chair is at any given time matters.
Committee chairs can have a great deal of influence over staffing issues
for the committees within the broader institutional constraints often imposed
by party leadership in the parent chamber.325 Some chairs will hire as many
staffers as possible to work for the chair of the full committee, while others
will allow the subcommittee chairs to hire more staff.326 Committee chairs
can also determine what kind of staff are hired by the committee, which can
involve hiring more with a policy focus or more with a communications or
public relations focus. For example, Casey Burgat and Charles Hunt have
found in their study of committee staffs between 2001 and 2017, that over
this period, the House Judiciary Committee lost about a third of its policyfocused staff and gained more communications aides.327 These scholars note
that for the House Judiciary Committee, “[t]here used to be about 25 policyfocused staffers for every communication aide. Now the ratio is closer to 5
to 1.”328 Different committee chairs make different choices about how many
and what kind of staff the committee will employ.
One key difference between the House and Senate Judiciary
Committees is the fact that the Senate Committee has always had a much
larger number of employees than its House counterpart. This may be due to
323
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the Senate Committee’s role in judicial nominations and confirmations.
Burgat and Hunt found that in 2001, the Senate Judiciary Committee had 157
staffers while the House Judiciary Committee employed only eighty-nine
staffers.329 In 2017, however, the Senate Committee employed 103 people
while the House Committee employed only seventy-seven.330 The ratio
among senior staffers, policy-oriented staffers, and communications staffers
seems to change depending on who is chairing each committee respectively.
The trend, however, is that the total number of staff for the Senate Committee
has been steadily declining in the 2001-2017 period, while the number of
House Committee staffers has fluctuated somewhat but remained generally
stable.331 Burgat and Hunt report that overall Senate committee staffs
dropped throughout the chamber by fifteen percent during the 2001-2017
period.332 The Senate Committee certainly has a smaller percentage of
communications staff when compared to its House counterpart.333
The individual chairing a congressional committee can also affect the
legislative effectiveness of that committee, as well as relationships with other
committees. John Baughman, in his study of cooperation and competition
among congressional committees, notes that the personalities of committee
leaders can contribute to the level of cooperation or confrontation among
committees.334 Citing Hall’s work,335 Baughman also argued that the House
member participation in committee work is uneven, allowing committee
chairs and a few highly interested committee members to dominate a
committee’s agenda.336 In their study of legislative effectiveness in
Congress, Craig Volden and Alan Wiseman found that committee and
subcommittee chairs had the highest legislative effectiveness scores.337 As
these scholars note, “[c]ommittee and subcommittee chairs significantly
outperformed minority-party members and members of their own party.”338
In his work on Senate committees, C. Lawrence Evans agrees, concluding
that, “Committee leaders tend to be more effective at managing information
the longer they have held the position, the broader their experience as a

329

This data was provided from these scholars directly to the author.
Id.
331
Burgat and Hunt, supra note 328
332
Burgat and Hunt, supra note 328.
333
Burgat and Hunt, supra note 328
334
JOHN BAUGHMAN, COMMON GROUND: COMMITTEE POLITICS IN THE U.S. HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES 180 (2006).
335
RICHARD L. HALL, PARTICIPATION IN CONGRESS (1996).
336
BAUGHMAN, supra note 334, at 185.
337
CRAIG VOLDEN AND ALAN E. WISEMAN, LEGISLATIVE EFFECTIVENESS IN THE UNITED
STATES CONGRESS 76 (2014).
338
Id.
330

MILLERMILLER ARTICLE FULLY FORMATTED (DO NOT DELETE)

246

SETON HALL LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL

4/1/2020 10:53 PM

[Vol. 44:2

committee leader, and the longer they have been in the Senate.”339
The committee chair on the Judiciary Committees holds a great deal of
power in the committee, especially in the House. Over the years, the prestige
and attractiveness of the House Judiciary Committee was largely driven by
the agenda of its chair.340 For example, Emanuel Celler (D-NY) maintained
control over the House Judiciary Committee by assigning the committee’s
subcommittees very vague jurisdictions so that he could directly control
which subcommittee received a specific bill.341 Chairman Jack Brooks (DTX), who served as committee chair in the early 1990s, has been described
as “aggressive,” although less autocratic than some of his predecessors.342
Chairman Jim Sensenbrenner (R-WI) was a hands-on chair who greatly
influenced the direction that the committee took, and especially in his disdain
for the federal judiciary. Sensenbrenner has been described as “opinionated
and direct to a fault,”343 “heavy-handed,” “gratuitously partisan,”344 and that
he “doesn’t suffer fools lightly. Known as much for his prickliness as his
smarts, he can be downright ornery to colleagues, journalists, unprepared
witnesses, and even constituents.”345 As a Senate Judiciary Committee
staffer told me in 2006, “Sensenbrenner is a partisan guy who wants to assert
his power and always get his way.”346
Decentralization and the respect for the rights of individual Senators
have in part made the Senate Judiciary Committee chair less powerful than
his House colleagues. Traditionally, the Senate Judiciary Committee has
been highly decentralized,347 as evidenced by the size of the committee staff,
for example. In 1965, when the average size of a committee staff was
twenty-eight, the Senate Judiciary Committee had 137 staffers, almost all
employed by the committee’s subcommittees and hired by their respective
chairs.348 Senator James Eastland (D-MS) allowed the subcommittees to
have a great deal of discretion in their work during his term as chair in the
1960s and 1970s.349 The decentralized nature of the Senate Judiciary
Committee continued into the 1980’s and has led scholars to refer to
339
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Republican Chairman Strom Thurmond as more constrained in his
leadership tactics than other Senate committee chairs at the time.350 Perhaps
Thurmond had no choice, but Evans describes the policy consequences of
his procedural choices as “negligible.”351 Thus, Thurmond was described as
being “fair, but his fairness had boundaries.”352 Given the institutional
constraints, some have even argued that the Senate Judiciary Committee
would not have tolerated a powerful committee chair in that era.353
More recent chairs of the Senate Judiciary Committee have asserted
their individual powers more forcefully. As former chair Senator Patrick
Leahy (D-VT) once told a journalist, “I’ve always set the agenda in
Judiciary.”354 Recently, however, Chairman Chuck Grassley (R-IA) has
yielded to pressure from the Majority Leader to change his blue-slip policy
and to refuse to allow hearings on President Obama’s nomination of Merrick
Garland to the U.S. Supreme Court.355 Thus, the Senate Judiciary Committee
reflects the realities of its parent chamber. However, the committee chair
can significantly influence the committee functions. For example, we have
seen many differences in how various Senate Judiciary chairs handled the
blue-slip process, as discussed in more detail above.356
It is certainly true that who is chairing the Judiciary Committees can
have an enormous effect on the relationship between the committee and the
federal courts. For example, House Judiciary Chair Emanuel Celler (D-NY)
was generally a friend of the federal courts, and he used his power as
committee chair to block jurisdiction stripping proposals and other anti-court
measures in the 1960’s and early 1970’s.357 Chairman Peter Rodino (D-NJ)
further protected the courts by making the committee a graveyard for
conservative anti-court measures, including various proposed constitutional
amendments in the 1970’s and 1980’s.358 Chairman Jack Brooks (D-TX)
generally followed the Rodino model. After the Republicans took control of
the full House (which was after the 1994 elections), Chairman Henry Hyde
(R-IL) was strongly supportive of the courts and did not allow the committee
to consider court-curbing measures.359 On the other hand, Hyde’s successor
350
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Chairman Jim Sensenbrenner (R-WI) was extremely antagonistic toward the
federal judiciary, as one staffer for a judicial branch agency that closely
follows court-Congress relations told me in 2018.360 As a Democratic
member of the House Judiciary Committee told me in 2006, “Chairman
Sensenbrenner wants to whip up the country against the courts, turning the
judges into the enemy. Federal judges feel physically insecure right now.”361
Sensenbrenner thereby led the charge against the federal judiciary and
convinced his committee to pass legislation that would have created an
Inspector General for the Federal Judiciary.
Subsequent chairs have been far less antagonistic towards the courts.
As one lobbyist mentioned in 2018, Chairman Lamar Smith (R-TX) was less
problematic for the courts than Sensenbrenner, while Chairman Bob
Goodlatte (R-VA) was quite sympathetic to the courts, and to federal judges
in particular.362 This individual concluded that, “Chairman Lamar Smith was
fine to work with on various issues affecting the federal courts.”363 Chairman
Jerrold Nadler (D-NY) has been a strong champion of the federal judiciary
and has led the charge against anti-court measures over the years.364 As one
lobbyist told me in 2018, “[t]he key factor of great importance in the
relationship between Congress and the courts is the committee leadership
and their individual attitudes towards the judiciary.”365
In order to understand the effects that an individual can have on the
committee, it is useful to compare two chairs of the House Judiciary
Committee who took very different approaches to leading the committee.
Comparing the leadership of Chairman Hyde and Sensenbrenner, both
conservative Midwestern Republicans, one congressional staffer explained
to me in 2006, “Congressman Hyde had an old-school approach to the courts,
treating judges with the respect deserved for members of a co-equal
institution. Sensenbrenner is a highly partisan guy who wants to assert his
own power and impose his will on anyone who gets in his way, including
federal judges.”366 When Representative Hyde stepped down as chair of the
House Judiciary Committee in 2001, the U.S. Judicial Conference passed a
resolution praising his assistance to the federal courts.367 On the other hand,
Chairman Sensenbrenner led institutional attacks against the courts,368 and
360
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convinced the House Committee to pass anti-court legislation, including a
bill that would have created an Inspector General for the federal judiciary.369
As chairman of the committee, he also led the committee in impeachment
investigations against several sitting federal judges, although these
committees did not come forward with the articles of impeachment in these
cases.370 Clearly, the individual who chairs the Judiciary Committees has a
strong effect on the relationship between the committees and the federal
judiciary.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
The relationship between Congress and the federal courts is clearly
complicated, and the interactions at any given moment in time are heavily
influenced by a variety of factors. The relationships between the courts and
the House Judiciary Committee and the Senate Judiciary Committee,
respectively, are equally complex. Both committees are dominated by
lawyer-legislators who serve on the committees in much greater numbers
than their proportion in the parent chambers.371 As the “Committees of
Lawyers,” both Judiciary Committees tend to have court-like and lawyerly
cultures that tend to prefer incrementalistic approaches to decision-making.
Traditionally, lawyers would protect the courts from attacks, although this
seemed to change in the early 2000’s, at least on the House Judiciary
Committee.372 The court-like decisional style, however, seems to be more
deeply engrained on the Senate Judiciary Committee. In overall terms, the
relationship between the committees and the courts has been cooperative at
times, but at other times it has been highly conflictual.
It is quite common for politicians to criticize specific court rulings with
which they disagree. It is very rare, however, for Congress to take action to
restrict the institutional power of the independent judiciary, and thus reduce
the voice of the courts in the inter-institutional dialogue that helps determine
constitutional meaning in our society.373 When Congress is angry with the
federal courts, it has a wide array of weapons in its arsenal to use against the
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judiciary. Although Congress often makes threats against the courts, such
measures are rarely used. Not only are the two Judiciary Committees the
chief voices of their respective chambers on constitutional issues, but they
are also the place where court-curbing legislation often begins. This is
especially true in the House, where the committee chair has stronger control
over the committee’s agenda than in the Senate.
The House and Senate Judiciary Committees are constrained by
broader institutional structures, norms, and cultures of their parent chambers.
The Senate has a long tradition of protecting the prerogatives and rights of
individual Senators, and the Senate committee system makes committees
much weaker than those in the House.374 Senate committees tend to be
decentralized, which gives the chair of the committee less power than his or
her House counterparts. The Senate is also likely to ignore most extreme
bills, that may pass the House, because of the procedural rules in the Senate,
including the filibuster on the Senate floor.375 Thus, Senate committees often
become graveyards for bills approved by the more aggressive House.
Whoever chairs the Senate Judiciary Committee must function in this
environment. The Senate Judiciary Committee often refuses to consider
anti-court legislation occasionally passed in the House.
The House, on the other hand, is a very hierarchical institution that
protects the needs of the majority party. Even though this power has shifted
back and forth over time between committee chairs and party leaders in the
chamber, the House Committee chairs have nevertheless retained a fair
amount of discretion to determine the committee’s approach to various
issues. This power is enhanced by the fact that on the House Judiciary
Committee, members tend to come from the extremes of each party, thus
giving the House Committee chair the advantage of having like-minded
colleagues in his or her party on the committee. The House Judiciary
Committee’s relationship with the federal courts is largely determined by the
preferences of whomever is chairing the committee. When the chair has an
anti-court agenda, then he or she is likely able to convince the members of
his or her party on the committee to follow their lead.376
Today, interest groups representing the Religious Right and the Tea
Party Movement play a large role in lobbying the two Judiciary Committees
about their desires to reign in the federal courts.377 In the late 1800’s and
early 1900’s, it was Progressives and Populists from the left who wanted to
limit the power of the then-conservative activist federal bench.378 Since the
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1950’s, however, conservative interest groups, especially those affiliated
with the Religious Right and other social conservative movements, wanted
to place restrictions on the policy-making abilities of the federal courts.379
These individuals want to reduce the voice of the federal courts by calling
for impeachment of judges who issue rulings with which they disagree or for
other structural changes that would restrict the independence of the federal
judiciary.380 In the early 2000’s, these groups were especially successful in
getting the attention of the members of the House Judiciary Committee and
its then chairman, Representative James Sensenbrenner (R-WI). These
socially conservative interest groups wanted to reduce what they perceived
to be the liberal activist voice of the federal courts in the inter-institutional
constitutional dialogue. The House Committee discussed a variety of anticourt measures, held a variety of hearings on anti-court legislation, set forth
potential articles of impeachment for several federal judges, and passed
several court-curbing bills in committee mark-ups.381 The conservative
lawyer members of the House Judiciary Committee accommodated the
desires of these groups, leading to what many labeled “The War on
Judges.”382
One key difference between the House and Senate Judiciary
Committees that does not seem to affect the relationship between the
committees and the federal courts is the role that the Senate committee plays
in the confirmation process for federal judicial nominees. Although the
House has no role in confirming federal judges, this difference does not seem
to make the Senate more protective of federal judges. Judges seem to leave
lobbying efforts for both committees to the professional lobbyists in the
Administrative Office of the Federal Courts, who speak on behalf of the
Judiciary Conference (the policy arm of the federal judiciary).383 Because
judges rarely contact either Members of Congress or Senators directly, the
role of the Senate in confirming federal judges does not seem to change the
committee’s interactions with the federal courts after the appointment and
confirmation stage.
The individual who is chairing the committee is perhaps the key
variable that shapes the relationship between the judiciary and the two
committees. This factor seems to be much more important in the House than
in the Senate, although it is important to see how various chairs of the Senate
Judiciary Committee have approached the blue-slip tradition during the
confirmation process for federal judges. While the chairs of the Senate
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Committee seem to be able to shape their committee’s approach to judicial
confirmations, within the constraints imposed by the party leadership in the
chamber, they have less power to influence the committee’s overall approach
to anti-court legislation.384 For example, when Senator Chuck Grassley (RIA) chaired the Senate Committee, he could not convince the committee to
approve his court-curbing agenda, in part because he could not overcome the
Senate’s general unwillingness to enact extreme and non-incrementalistic
measures. Senator Grassley also did not want to increase tensions with the
other members of the committee on legislative matters because he was
compelled by the party leadership to take certain highly controversial steps
on the judicial confirmation side. One example, in particular, was Senator
Grassley’s refusal to hold confirmation hearings on President Obama’s
appointment of Judge Merrick Garland to the U.S. Supreme Court.385 The
Senate Judiciary Committee is thus clearly reflective of the broader culture
of its parent chamber, which means it is harder for the Senate chair to control
the approach of the committee, unlike the House chair.
In the House, the key variable in court-Congress relations seems to be
the agenda of the chair of the House Judiciary Committee. In general,
committee chairs in the House have a great deal of discretion when it comes
to setting the tone, approach, and agenda of their committee. When chairs
of the House Judiciary Committee like Representatives Rodino (D-NJ),
Hyde (R-IL), or Nadler (D-NY), wanted to protect the courts from attacks,
they were able to do so. On the other hand, when chairs like Representative
Sensenbrenner (R-WI) wanted to restrict the independence of the courts, he
was able to convince the committee members to follow his lead in part
because the committee has traditionally drawn its members from the most
extreme wings of both parties. Sensenbrenner was able to shape the work of
the committee to promote his personal anti-court agenda which also reflected
the agenda of the key Religious Right, Tea Party, and other socially
conservative interest groups. This was in part due to the fact that Republican
members of the committee all supported those same groups.386 It is worth
noting, however, that few of these measures were considered on the floor of
the House. Although the relationship between the Judiciary Committees and
the federal courts are extremely complicated, there are many variables to
consider. Ultimately, a key factor to consider is the committee chair, who
can have a profound effect on the role that each branch plays in the interinstitutional constitutional dialogue.
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